297. The Decisive Battle

The Decisive Battle

There are so damn many YouTube channels devoted to military history it’s getting ridiculous. There are now two devoted to doing short ship biographies. I click on them thinking, well, I know this material, but I wonder if they will cover X, and then I listen to the entire thing and learn a few things I didn't know. And since there have been a series of them on WW2 USN ship classes recently, it’s got me thinking of yet more ways to address the ungraspable scope of late Pacific War conflict. Yes, I know I need help, but until I receive it, here’s a “quick” look at the “Decisive Battle” of the Pacific War that doesn’t go into the action, but merely looks at the ship assets at the time.

The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was focused, before the actual war, on a Decisive Battle that it imagined would occur in the Western Pacific somewhere around the Caroline/Mariana Islands. All their plans -- including the ships and planes they chose to build -- were in the interest of winning this battle. They imagined the US Fleet would have to fight its way across the Pacific, getting weaker and weaker as it suffered losses from submarine, aircraft, and other attacks. Only when it was weaker and over extended would they charge out with their heavy battle force to crush the USN. The only part of this plan that went the way the IJN hoped was their husbanding of their battleship assets to mid 1944. Everything else was a disaster.

The USN did suffer losses, severe losses, especially during 1942. But as they surged forward they brought with them floating dry-docks and other repair assets that allowed them to maintain their ships even in the Central Pacific. And the flow of ships returning to America for more extensive repairs was more than offset by the constant addition of new ships to the fleet. The commissioning of new ships increased year by year and was still going strong when the war ended. As often happens, the IJN had expected their opponents to do what they would/could do. (The USN made the same mistake when it took them over a year to notice that Japan was not building new tankers and destroyers fast enough to replace their losses. Once they realized this, those classes of ships were made priority targets and their losses surged until Japan had a severe shortage of both.)

Now, there is one problem to going into asset detail about “the” Decisive Battle of the Pacific War -- there were kind of two of them. The Battle of the Philippine Sea was the decisive battle. After that engagement the IJN had no chance of winning. But that had been one of the carrier vs carrier battles where surface ships didn’t engage each other. The Decisive Battle everyone envisioned had to involve the battleships. So there is also a sub-Decisive (or post-Decisive) Battle of Leyte Gulf. I’m just going to cover the final battle as that should make my point. 

Also, I can’t help pointing out that two more USN new battleships, two battle cruisers (technically "Large" cruisers), and twelve new heavy cruisers in addition to thirteen Essex class carriers and three even larger Midway class carriers were in the pipeline and would be commissioned later in or just after the war ended.

I will list the ships belonging to the major divisions of each navy’s forces at Leyte Gulf. I will also, and this is central to my point, indicate if the ship was commissioned during the war or before the war began. What you will see, I believe, is that the USN fleets the IJN actually encountered in mid-1944 were to a large extent a new navy -- one that hadn’t existed on December 7th, 1941. While the IJN fleets would be what had survived the fighting to that point.


The Battle of Leyte Gulf - October 1944

USN Third Fleet, Task Force 38
Task Group 38:1 - CVs (Large Fleet Carriers) Wasp, Hornet, Hancock - CVLs (Light Fleet Carriers) Monterey, Cowpens - CAs (Heavy Cruisers) Chester, Pensacola, Salt Lake City, Boston - CLs (Light Cruisers) San Diego, Oakland

Task Group 38:2 CV Entrepid - CVLs Cabot, Independence - BBs (Battleships) Iowa, New Jersey (Halsey's flagship) - CLs Biloxi, Vincennes, Miami

Task Group 38:3 - CVs Essex, Lexington - CVLs Princeton, Langley - BBs Massachusetts, South Dakota - CLs Santa Fe, Birmingham, Mobile, Reno

Task Group 38:4 - CVs Franklin, Enterprise - CVLs San Jacinto, Belleau Wood - BBs Washington (Lee), Alabama - CAs Wichita, New Orleans 

USN Seventh Fleet, Task Force 77
BBs West Virginia x, Maryland y, Mississippi, Tennessee y, California x, Pennsylvania y- CAs Louisville, Portland, Minneapolis, HMAS Shropshire - CLs Denver, Columbia, Phoenix, Boise

x = Sunk at Pearl Harbor. y= Damaged at Pearl Harbor

Task Unit 77.4.3 - CVE (Escort Carriers) Fanshaw Bay, Kalinin Bay, Gambier Bay, White Plains

Task Units 77.4.1-2 had similar numbers of war-built escort carriers

CA HMAS Australia and CL USS Honolulu had been badly damaged prior to the start of the battle and were retiring to Manus for repairs.

IJN 
Northern Force -  CV Zuikaku - CVLs Zuihō, Chitose,  Chiyoda - BBs Hyūga, Ise - CLs Ōyodo, Tama, Isuzu
Center Force - BBs Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongō, Haruna - CAs Atago, Maya, Takao, Chōkai, Myōkō, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Tone, Chikuma - CLs Noshiro, Yahagi
Southern Force -  BBs Yamashiro, Fusō - CA Mogami

Second Striking Force -  CAs Nachi, Ashigara - CL Abukuma 

So, at the closest thing the Pacific War had to the imagined "Decisive Battle," the IJN could only bring two new super-battleships and three new light cruisers. Meanwhile, aside from Seventh Fleet's old fire support battleship force and the heavy cruiser force (the new heavy cruisers were just starting to hit the fleets), the USN was almost entirely wartime construction.

What would also be interesting to show (I have to draw the line somewhere) would be the USN assets that weren't even mobilized for this battle. While the IJN had been carefully -- arguably, too carefully -- husbanding their main battle force for this moment, the USN had been using their assets more vigorously which meant that there were, for example two battleships that were not present for one reason or another (they were either being rested or repaired). And the same was true of all the other classes of ships. 

And since all this data about the USN fleets is here, as I've mentioned before, you can see that Admiral Lee had his flag on the USS Washington when he should have been on either the Iowa or New Jersey so he could lead the fastest and most powerful battleship force Third Fleet could delegate. And Halsey had his flag on the New Jersey when it should have been on a cruiser for maximum flexibility. 

(I've been thinking about this since I published it last night and I want to give Admiral Lee the benefit of the doubt here. He had a strong bond with the Washington and her crew, and if you divided the American battleship force into two equal units, three fast and three slow, then Washington would fit with the Iowa class ships. But, the whole idea of a "fast" force is to have the speed to chase down the enemy, and Washington would have slowed the force down from 33 knots to 28 knots. The only sensible division of the battleship force would have been two fast and four slow. So Lee really should have been on one of the Iowas or on a cruiser. 

Both Spruance and Kurita realized that the logical place for a modern fleet commander was in a heavy cruiser, but Halsey had to be in the biggest ship under his command. And even though he got burned by this at Leyte Gulf, he didn't learn and stayed on the New Jersey for the rest of the war. While this only led to embarrassment, not disaster, at Leyte Gulf, it is indicative of his poor decision making while in command of Third Fleet.)

P.S. The final IJN operation of the Pacific War was Operation Ten-Go, a suicide run by the BB Yamato with some escort ships to attack the American invasion force off Okinawa. Spruance was in command of Fifth Fleet at the time, so he sent his battleship force, again six ships but this time three Iowas (though not Iowa) and three of the slower South Dakotas. Marc Mitscher was in command of Task Force 58, the carrier force, and he had no patience for the dreams of the battleship officers. He launched a massive attack that sank both Yamato and the CL Yahagi about the time they lost sight of Japan. 

But here's what caught my eye when reviewing this engagement. The IJN lost between 3,700 and 4,250 men killed on that day. The USN's two worst days of the Pacific War were when Pearl Harbor was attacked (2,335 killed) and the Battle of Savo island (1,077 killed including Australians), so a total of 3,412 killed. And the IJN threw away more lives than that for Ten-Go with nothing at all to show for it. No one has any idea how many men the IJN lost at Leyte Gulf but it would have been far higher than even this 4,250 figure.

The tree that wouldn’t die

After two rough years, the little potted tree in our alley, now sitting outside my window, has finally had a good year. 

Not only have all its remaining branches remained unbroken, but it’s developed a bush like addition at its base. I will probably trim this once it drops its leaves -- in the next month or so -- but I wanted to give it all the leaves possible to make up for the branches it’s lost.

While it still looks green and fairly healthy, in fact it is preparing for its yearly taking-out-of-the-trash. Its leaves are accumulating whatever the tree doesn’t need, and soon I will be sweeping up its garbage. The leaves lost their completely-healthy look last month. But I’m still just amazed that the poor thing is still seemingly thriving, given its modest pot, modest supply of water and nutrients, and modest dose of sun -- between the narrow alley and all our fog, its sun exposure is truly limited.


I’ve thought of planting something more attractive in the dirt around its base, or just mulching it, but for all I know the grass that has found a home there is fixing nitrogen or something else useful. At any rate, migrant grass is probably the perfect sidekick for such a determined little tree.